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 Independence and Property in Kant's Rechtslehre 
 
Right and independence  
In The Metaphysics of Morals Kant argues that the universal principle of right provides the 
means of determining how the freedom of each and every person can be made to coexist in 
accordance with a universal law. He states that an action is right ‘if on its maxim the freedom 
of choice [Freiheit der Willkür] of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance 
with a universal law’ (AA 6: 230; PP, 387).1 From this statement it appears that the freedom 
of choice of each and every person is what must be made to coexist by means of a universal 
law, as long as one assumes that the general term ‘freedom’ used in this statement also 
signifies freedom of choice. It would then be a matter of limiting a person’s freedom of 
choice in accordance with a universal law if and only if this person’s exercise of freedom of 
choice would make it impossible for other persons to exercise free choice. This interpretation 
is supported by Kant’s definition of right as ‘the sum of the conditions under which the 
choice [die Willkür] of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a 
universal law of freedom’ (AA 6: 230; PP, 387). Other statements, however, suggest an 
alternative interpretation of the freedom for the sake of which freedom of choice is to be 
limited in accordance with a universal law.  
The idea that right concerns not only freedom of choice but also a different, more 
fundamental notion of freedom is signalled by Kant’s later claim that the ‘only original right’ 
possessed by individuals in virtue of their humanity alone is the following one: ‘Freedom 
(independence from being constrained by another’s choice [Unabhängigkeit von eines 
Anderen nöthigender Willkür]), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in 
accordance with a universal law’ (AA 6: 237; PP, 393). Thus the form of freedom that right 
protects is more fundamentally the freedom that consists in not being subject to the choices of 
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another person in such a way that this person’s exercise of free choice, and not one’s own 
exercise of it, determines what one does.2  
This independence cannot be identified with freedom of choice, however, because it is 
a negative condition of any genuine act of free choice and must, therefore, be regarded as a 
logically distinct form of freedom. In short, independence must be presupposed in order to 
explain the possibility of not being subject to the choices of others in such a way that their 
choices determine, and thus constrain, one to act in certain ways and not in others 
independently of what one oneself wills (or would will) to do. This independence is 
fundamental to Kant’s Rechtslehre in the sense that it is what ultimately determines whether 
or not an action can be considered to be a rightful one and what laws and institutions are the 
conditions of right. It is therefore not the case that guaranteeing right is simply a matter of 
securing or promoting a certain outcome (that is, independence), in which case right would be 
reduced to the means to an end which remains external to it. Rather, the end of securing 
independence is constitutive of the concept of right itself. What does this independence of the 
choices of another person or persons really mean, though? And how can the idea of this 
independence serve to determine the rightful scope of freedom of choice? In what follows, I 
shall show how another central feature of Kant’s Rechtslehre, namely his apparent 
presumption in favour of private property, is of major significance in relation to such 
questions. 
Kant speaks of an ‘innate equality, that is, independence from being bound by others 
to more than one can in turn bind them; hence a human being’s quality of being his own 
master (sui juris)’ (AA 6: 237; PP, 393f.). This claim provides a clue as to the source of his 
understanding of independence and how it can be guaranteed within a legal and political 
community in which each and every member enjoys an equal status. The notion of freedom 
as independence is here associated specifically with the idea of being one’s own master, in 
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the sense of not being subject to the arbitrary will of another person to whom one is in some 
way one-sidedly bound. Yet what does being subject to the arbitrary will of another person 
mean in practice? Does it, for example, concern only direct forms of interference that prevent 
or undermine a person’s exercise of freedom of choice, or does independence of the 
constraining choice of others also concern the absence of the mere possibility of being 
subjected by others to interference on an arbitrary basis, as defenders of a distinctively 
republican conception of freedom argue?3 Support for the view that Kant has in mind the 
second notion of independence can be provided with reference to certain key ideas found in 
the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who deeply influenced Kant and can, therefore, 
justifiably be assumed to be an important source for his understanding of the form of freedom 
expressed by means of the idea of being one’s own master and how this freedom can be 
guaranteed within a legal and political community.4  
Kant’s characterization of the criterion of independence in terms of ‘not being bound 
by others to more than one can in turn bind them’ echoes Rousseau’s claim that with 
regarding a legitimate social contract each and every party to this contract must completely 
renounce his or her natural freedom, because only in this way can the condition be ‘equal for 
all’, with no one having ‘any interest in making it burdensome to the rest’.5 In other words, a 
minimum requirement of a legitimate legal and political order in which genuine personal 
independence exists is that all its members are equal in the sense of being subject to the same 
fundamental conditions (that is, laws and obligations) to the same degree. If, by contrast, 
some people were subject to conditions to which others were not equally subject, they would 
bear additional burdens, and this state of affairs would be inconsistent with the idea of 
equality. We may assume, moreover, that the people who bear additional burdens would be 
dependent on the arbitrary wills of individuals or of social groups who are not subject to the 
same burdens or are not subject to them to the same degree. These individuals or social 
4 
 
 
groups would then be in the position to constrain the choices of others by demanding that 
they fulfil the obligations associated with these additional burdens without their freedom of 
choice being correspondingly constrained.  
Kant’s debt to Rousseau is shown by what he has to say about the role of interest in 
determining the terms of the social contract. In the following passage, Kant assumes either 
(1) that no one would willingly wrong him- or herself by submitting him- or herself to 
conditions that are contrary to his or her own fundamental interests, including that of securing 
personal independence, even if he or she would willingly harm the interests of others, or (2) 
that even if the act of voluntarily submitting to such conditions is sufficient to render them 
legitimate in one’s own case, it would not make them legitimate in the case of others who 
have not consented to them. The first assumption appears to be what Rousseau has in mind.  
For Kant, it is by generalizing such an assumption that the laws to which individuals could 
reasonably subject both themselves and others can be determined:   
 
Now when someone makes arrangements about another, it is always possible for him 
to do the other wrong; but he can never do wrong in what he decides upon with regard 
to himself (for volenti non fit iniuria). Therefore only the concurring and united will 
of all, insofar as each decides the same thing for all and all for each, and so only the 
general united will of the people, can be legislative. (AA 6: 313f.; PP, 457) 
 
Yet what exactly are the conditions to which each and every member becomes equally 
subject and that are discoverable by means of an ideally conceived social contract based on 
the act of generalizing that which individuals would willingly accept given certain 
fundamental interests that they are assumed to share? Is it simply a matter of being subject to 
the same laws and subject to them to the same extent as others are, or is something more 
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required, such as the removal of any other real or potential threats to freedom in the sense of 
independence of the arbitrary wills of others? 
It is of particular significance in this regard that Kant accepts the existence of certain 
property rights and social relations based on them that make one person subject to the 
arbitrary will of another person within a rightfully constituted legal and political community. 
Thus the problem arises as to how property rights whose existence results in an absence of 
full independence in the case of some citizens can be justified when Kant himself identifies 
independence as the single innate right that individuals possess in virtue of their humanity 
alone. This tension between Kant’s commitment to the idea of independence in the sense of 
not being subject to the arbitrary will or freedom of choice of another person and his 
acceptance of one-sided forms of dependence based on property rights means that his account 
of property rights is of central importance when it comes to the question of the coherence of 
his Rechtslehre. Although Kant’s account of property rights will be shown to imply a 
presumption in favour of private property, I shall argue that there are, in fact, no reasons 
internal to his Rechtslehre for denying the legitimacy of alternative forms of ownership, nor 
even for preferring private property in all possible cases. Although there could be reasons for 
preferring private property to other forms of property in some particular cases, deciding such 
an issue concerns only the application of the principles of Kant’s Rechtslehre and not these 
principles themselves. 
 
Property and dependence  
Kant’s acceptance of the legitimacy of one-sided forms of dependence based on property 
relations is evident from the distinction he draws between active and passive citizenship. 6 For 
Kant, the status of citizen is the only relevant qualification when it comes to being fit to vote. 
Yet he restricts active citizenship, which confers the right to vote, to individuals who already 
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possess the quality of being independent in virtue of their status as the owners of property of 
a certain type. This is shown by some of his examples of people who are not independent in 
the relevant sense and must, therefore, be denied the right to vote, namely, those individuals 
who have only their labour to sell (for example, the ‘woodcutter I hire to work in my yard’) 
and tenant farmers who do not own the land they cultivate (AA 6: 314f.; PP, 457f.).  
These examples imply that lack of full independence typically derives from the way 
in which a person’s ability to live from his or her labour is dependent on another person’s 
will, with this dependence being a function of existing property relations and the nature of 
that which one owns. The relation of the wage labourer to the person who employs him is one 
in which the latter possesses for a specific period of time the labour of the former, while the 
tenant farmer’s activity depends on the landowner’s agreement to lease him the land that he 
wishes to cultivate without owning it. In both cases there exist relations of dependence that 
are ultimately to be explained in terms of the absence of any property other than one’s own 
labour in the case of one party and the means of purchasing the labour-power of others or the 
ownership of some productive means other than one’s labour in the case of the other party. 
Kant claims that this type of dependence on the will of another person and the political 
inequality that it entails are not incompatible with the freedom and equality that passive 
citizens enjoy in common with others as human beings, because the passive citizen’s lack of 
the right to vote does not violate the other attributes of citizenship that Kant identifies, 
including equal legal status. There must, moreover, exist the possibility of being able to work 
oneself up from the position of passive citizen to that of active citizen (AA 6: 314f.; PP, 
458f.).  
Given that Kant identifies independence as an innate right that a person possesses in 
virtue of his or her humanity alone, it is far from self-evident that property rights should be 
allowed to override this innate right in the case of people who have only their own labour to 
7 
 
 
sell, resulting in their absence of full independence. Rather, any restrictions on the scope of a 
citizen’s independence would themselves have to be justified in terms of this innate right. 
Since Kant’s distinction between active and passive citizenship is connected with the right of 
full political participation, it may have been motivated largely by the thought that individuals 
who are economically dependent on others may be forced to vote in a certain way on matters 
of general concern so as to protect their livelihoods. This reason for not granting them full 
political independence simply invites the question, however, as to why relations of economic 
dependence which give one individual power over the free choice of another individual 
should not instead be removed. Given the way in which this form of domination depends on 
the existence of property rights of a certain type, the question can be reformulated as follows: 
why should such property rights and any social relations based on them be allowed to 
override the innate right of independence when this right is something that right itself ought 
to guarantee? The precise nature of this problem can be made clearer with reference to the 
way in which Kant’s distinction between active and passive citizenship shows that he himself 
recognizes that relations of economic dependence favour indirect forms of coercion based on 
different degrees of social power, with the weaker party being forced to act in conformity 
with the choices of another party without the latter needing to exercise any direct form of 
coercion.  
Kant does not restrict possible violations of the external freedom which is the object 
of right to direct forms of interference. Rather, he identifies the concept of right ‘with the 
external and indeed practical relation of one person to another, insofar as their actions, as 
deeds, can have (direct or indirect) influence on each other’ (AA 6: 230; PP, 387). Thus, there 
could be a type of coercion in Kant’s sense that takes the form of hints or suggestions of what 
will happen if one person does not act in conformity with the choices of another 
economically and socially more powerful person or group. The difficulty of voting 
8 
 
 
independently in the face of relations of economic dependence itself provides an example of 
how the freedom of choice of one person could be constrained by the freedom of choice of 
another person in the absence of any direct form of coercion (provided one ignores such 
measures as the introduction of secret ballots). This is because it represents a situation in 
which a person is not in the position to decide independently who should represent him or her 
and is thereby not able to exercise genuine freedom of choice through engaging in a practice 
that occurs in the phenomenal world. This person is instead indirectly made to choose in 
accordance with the views or interests of another person. The individual with more economic 
and social power with whom another individual stands in an asymmetrical relation of 
dependence may admittedly choose not to interfere with the freedom of choice of another. He 
or she may, in fact, be benevolently disposed towards the other individual and will tend to act 
in accordance with a paternalistic sense of duty in relation to him or her. Yet this situation 
would itself be incompatible with the republican conception of freedom as independence of 
the arbitrary wills of others, for which the mere possibility of being subjected by others to 
some form of interference on an arbitrary basis is sufficient to render people unfree because 
of the potential for domination contained in such a situation.7 Legal protection from possible 
as well as actual interference is therefore a necessary condition of genuine independence.  
Kant’s acceptance of forms of domination based on different degrees of economic and 
social power that are a function of property rights and the social relations based on them 
appears, then, to render his account of citizenship incompatible with the republican notion of 
freedom found in his Rechtslehre. This notion of freedom implies that the freedom of choice 
of one person can coexist with the freedom of choice of another person in accordance with a 
universal law if and only if both persons possess full independence of the arbitrary wills of 
others. From the standpoint of right, therefore, it is legitimate to limit freedom of choice with 
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the aim of guaranteeing the full independence of all citizens whenever republican freedom 
and freedom of choice turn out to be incompatible. 
Kant is clearly uncomfortable with certain features of the property relations that 
underlie his distinction between active and passive citizenship in so far as it depends on the 
existence of people who have only their own labour to sell and are confronted by others who 
are in a position to purchase it. This is despite his acceptance of the legitimacy of the type of 
contractual relation which he describes in terms of the ‘possession of another’s choice, in the 
sense of my capacity to determine it by my own choice to a certain deed in accordance with 
laws of freedom’ (AA 6: 271; PP, 421), and in terms of the act of ‘granting another the use of 
my powers for a specified price’ (AA 6: 285; PP, 433). Nevertheless, Kant indirectly imposes 
moral limitations on the permissible use of another person’s labour-power in connection with 
the contract between master and servant. This example is of wider import because it could be 
extended to include any contract between an employer and the person who sells him his 
labour.  
Kant maintains that the ‘contract of the head of a household with servants can … not 
be such that his use of them would amount to using them up; and it is not for him alone to 
judge about this, but also for the servants (who, accordingly, can never be serfs)’ (AA 6: 283; 
PP, 432). This claim leaves room for the idea that even when a person has sold his or her 
labour-power to another person for a limited period of time, restrictions on how intensely the 
employer may use this labour-power within this period of time ought nevertheless to apply, 
and these restrictions ought, moreover, to be determined by the employee as well as by the 
employer. In short, Kant appears to grant workers certain economic rights. He also appears to 
be hostile to the idea that human beings own themselves and therefore have the right to 
dispose of themselves as they please when he states that ‘someone can be his own master 
[sein eigener Herr] (sui juris) but cannot be the owner [Eigenthümer] of himself (sui 
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dominus) (cannot dispose of himself as he pleases) (AA 6: 270; PP, 421). He does not, 
therefore, appear to endorse unequivocally the idea of self-ownership that underpins the right 
to dispose freely of one’s own labour by entering into contractual relations with others 
whatever the conditions specified in a contract may be. 
The fact that property rights often concern physical objects, and typically did so in 
Kant’s own time, makes them into a prime example of the external freedom that forms the 
object of right, as Kant himself makes clear by discussing such rights under the heading 
‘Concerning what is externally mine and yours in general’. As I have shown above, Kant 
appears to accept that the independence of one person may be legitimately constrained by 
another person’s exclusive right to parts of the world or to specific objects within it, even 
though guaranteeing independence is an end that is constitutive of the concept of right.  
One way of explaining this tension in Kant’s Rechtslehre between the principles of 
freedom and equality, on the one hand, and his acceptance of forms of domination, on the 
other, is to view it as the product of a more fundamental tension between a priori principles 
of right and an a posteriori notion of independence drawn from a traditional conception of 
the form of independence enjoyed by a citizen.8 In short, the concept of right as a matter of 
pure practical reason and the normative implications of this concept are compromised by 
their association with certain defining characteristics of citizenship uncritically derived from 
traditional views of what it means to be a citizen. This explanation still leaves us with the 
question, however, as to whether Kant is able to provide a justification of property rights and 
social relations based on them that generate one-sided forms of dependence which have the 
potential to allow one person to determine the freedom of choice of another person, and to do 
so, moreover, in such a way as not to compromise his commitment to the idea of freedom as 
independence of the arbitrary wills of others. 
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Kant appears to want to justify certain pre-political property rights that constrain the 
ways in which any legal and political community may legitimately seek to achieve the end of 
securing the independence of its all members, in the sense that to violate these rights would 
itself undermine their independence in so far as it requires being able to choose how one 
employs the means at one’s disposable independently of the choices of others.9 In short, 
property rights are to be regarded as constitutive of the independence that right ought to 
guarantee, in the sense that they are conditions of being able to exercise free choice 
independently of others. This argument, which depends on the idea that to be independent 
requires having the right to dispose freely of one’s property, begs the question, however, 
because it assumes that property rights of this type are indeed conditions of independence. If 
property rights of a certain kind turn out to be incompatible with the full independence of 
others, as Kant recognizes they can be, this assumption begins to look problematic, especially 
when the right of property is for Kant only an acquired right, whereas independence is an 
innate one. One could argue instead that determining the legitimacy of property rights 
according to what is required to secure the genuine independence of all citizens will, in fact, 
generate considerable limits on the right to dispose freely of objects to which one allegedly 
possesses an absolute right. Here independence provides the criterion against which any 
claim to possess a right to exclude others from parts of the world or from objects within it 
must be judged, rather than independence being measured in terms of the right to dispose 
freely of property, in which case the possession of this right is merely assumed to define (if 
only partly) what it means to be independent.  
Rousseau’s account of the transition from a state of natural freedom to a civil 
condition made possible by means of a legitimate social contract illustrates the full force of 
the difficulty faced by Kant once he is understood to be attempting to establish a pre-political 
right of property that constrains the ways in which any legal and political community may 
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legitimately seek to achieve the end of securing the independence of its members. The 
republican notions of equality and freedom are central to this account. Rousseau asserts that 
the clauses of the contract in question ‘all come down to just one, namely the total alienation 
of each associate with all of his rights to the whole community’.10 This claim could be taken 
to mean that any provisional property rights - assuming that it is meaningful to speak of such 
rights at all - cannot simply be assumed to be valid once the transition to the civil condition 
has been made. Rather, all such rights must be examined in the light of the principles of 
equality and freedom that determine the form of any legal and political community which 
meets the requirements of a legitimate social contract. If these provisional property rights turn 
out to be incompatible with the principle of equality and/or the principle of freedom 
conceived in terms of independence of the arbitrary wills of others, the claims on which these 
rights are based would have to be dismissed as incompatible with the very foundations of 
right.11  
In the next section, I shall argue that if Kant is seeking to justify the idea of certain 
pre-political property rights that would limit what can legitimately be done to secure 
republican freedom, he must ultimately be thought to fail in this endeavour. Kant’s 
commitment to the universalization of the republican principles of equality and freedom 
understood as independence of the arbitrary wills of others renders the idea of such pre-
political property rights so insecure that it would have be better to reject the possibility of any 
such rights altogether. There are, moreover, good (if not conclusive) reasons for thinking that 
Kant connects such pre-political, provisional property rights with private property in 
particular. The problematic nature of these rights also means, therefore, that there can be no 
presumption in favour of private property, though there may be particular cases in which 
private property represents the best means of securing each citizen’s independence. 
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Kant on property 
Kant implies that there can be provisional, pre-political property rights when he identifies 
private right (Privatrecht) with natural right (Naturrecht), and accordingly speaks of private 
right as existing in a state of nature, thereby contrasting it with public right (das öffentliche 
Recht) which is possible only within a legal and political community (AA 6: 242; PP, 397). 
The possibility of right in a state of nature implies the existence of a pre-political form of 
right based on principles of pure practical reason. This form of right is the topic of the first 
part of the Rechtslehre, and it is here that we encounter Kant’s account of rights of possession.  
This account of rights of possession develops into what can be regarded as an attempt 
to justify private property in particular, for by the end of the section on ‘property right’ 
(Sachenrecht) Kant has come to speak of an ‘external object which in terms of its substance 
belongs to someone is his property (dominium), in which all rights in this thing inhere (as 
accidents of a substance) and which the owner (dominus) can, accordingly, dispose of as he 
pleases (ius disponendi de re sua)’ (AA 6: 270; PP, 421). The right to dispose of an external 
object as one pleases distinguishes private property from other possible forms of ownership 
such as the right to use something only under certain conditions and without the right to 
alienate it to others. Kant’s use of the phrase ‘mine and thine’ implies, moreover, exclusive 
possession of an object and thereby private ownership in particular, as does his statement that 
that ‘is rightfully mine (meum iuris) with which I am so connected that another’s use of it 
without my consent would wrong me’ (AA 6: 245; PP, 401). Thus there are some clear 
grounds for viewing Kant’s account of private right as an attempt to justify private property 
in particular.12 Property rights of this kind would exist even in the state of nature and would 
constrain the ways in any legal and political community may legitimately seek to secure the 
independence of its all members. 
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Kant explains the possibility of an external object that is rightfully one’s own in terms 
of the idea of intelligible possession. This form of possession does not depend on the 
empirical (that is, physical) possession of an object. The idea of intelligible possession is 
introduced because only it can explain the wrongness of an act whereby another person uses a 
thing which is rightfully mine even though I do not physically possess this thing and it did 
not, therefore, need to be forcibly taken from me. Thus intelligible or ‘merely rightful’ 
possession ‘must be assumed to be possible if something external is to be mine or yours’ (AA 
6: 249; PP, 403). In this way, Kant can be seen to assume that there are indeed cases of the 
rightful possession of external objects and then to seek to identify the necessary conditions of 
the possibility of this type of possession. This explains his use of the term ‘deduction’ in the 
relevant part of his Rechtslehre. From what he means by this term in the Critique of Pure 
Reason (KrV, A 84f./B 116f.), he can be taken to mean a justification of our use of the 
concept of rightful possession of an external object through the demonstration of the 
necessity of such a concept when it comes to explaining our general experience of the world. 
The fact that Kant’s use of the phrase ‘mine and thine’ together with the notion of a right to 
dispose of an object as one pleases imply the exclusive possession of an object and thus 
private ownership in particular means, however, that he cannot proceed on the assumption 
that recognition of the object of the deduction he is undertaking can be taken for granted in 
the same way as experience in general can be, and that it is, therefore, only a matter of 
demonstrating the necessary conditions of this object’s possibility. Rather, the object itself is 
one whose legitimacy has been, and continues to be, disputed. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that Kant’s attempt to establish the validity of an exclusive right of ownership appeals in 
particular to the conditions of the possibility of the use of a thing.  
Kant argues that in the absence of exclusive possession of parts of the world or 
objects within it use of things in accordance with a universal law would not be possible. In 
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this connection he speaks of ‘the postulate of practical reason with regard to rights: “that it is 
a duty of right to act towards others so that what is external (usable) could also become 
someone’s”’ (AA 6: 252; PP, 406). In this way, Kant introduces an argument that depends on 
the premise that the use of things is possible only if there is already an exclusive right to them. 
This argument can be related to the idea of independence if the condition of being 
independent is assumed to require being able to choose independently of the choices of others 
how one employs any means at one’s disposable.13 Can the notion of use by itself, however, 
really justify an unlimited right to exclude others from the use or benefit of something and to 
dispose of it as one pleases? 
 Although Kant’s appeal to the conditions of the use of external objects does not mean 
that intelligible possession and the rights of ownership connected with it are established by 
the act of using a thing, the notion of use is invoked to justify exclusive possession of parts of 
the world and objects within it in the following passage: 
 
For an object of my choice is something that I have the physical power to use. If it 
were nevertheless absolutely not within my rightful power to make use of it, that is, if 
the use of it could not coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a 
universal law (would be wrong), then freedom would be depriving itself of the use of 
its choice with regard to an object of choice, by putting usable objects beyond any 
possibility of being used; in other words, it would annihilate them in a practical 
respect and make them into res nullius, even though in the use of things choice was 
formally consistent with everyone’s outer freedom in accordance with universal laws. 
(AA 6: 246; PP, 405) 
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The final part of this passage assumes the existence of a rightful condition in which 
the freedom of choice of one person can coexist with the freedom of choice of others in so far 
as the exercise of free choice concerns external actions and the use of objects. Since it is a 
matter of free choice, the use of objects must be taken to mean use of them in accordance 
with ends that a person has formed. This implies the notion of effective use in the sense of the 
appropriateness of the object in relation to an end. The rightful existence of mine and thine, 
that is to say, the existence of objects that are the rightful property of someone who possesses 
the right to exclude others from the use of them, is here simply presupposed. It is therefore 
not the case that the use of an object establishes a right to an object. Rather, Kant appeals to 
the idea of the absurdity of a hypothetical situation in which the freedom to dispose freely of 
objects of freedom of choice was counterfactually conceived to be contrary to right.  
This situation would be absurd because the restriction in question would make the use 
of objects in accordance with ends impossible, by denying agents an exclusive right to things 
external to them and thereby ruling out altogether the possibility of their being able to 
exercise free choice, which is assumed to require having a thing completely at one’s disposal. 
Kant here appears to claim that (1) the use of external objects in accordance with ends is 
possible only if the rightful possession of them is an exclusive one, and so for an external 
object to be an object of free choice at all its owner must possess an exclusive right to it, and 
then to argue as a consequence (1)  that (2) only a condition in which property rights are of an 
exclusive kind will be one in which the freedom of choice of one person is able to coexist 
with the freedom of choice of others in accordance with a universal law not only formally but 
also with regard to the actual use of objects. The first claim will be shown to represent 
nothing more than an assumption on Kant’s part. This undermines in turn claim (2) which 
clearly depends on it.  
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The possibility of the use of objects in accordance with ends does not self-evidently 
depend on having an exclusive right to dispose of them as one pleases, and the possibility of 
free choice cannot, therefore, be held always to depend on exclusive possession, as Kant 
implies it does when he states that ‘an object of my choice is that which I have the physical 
capacity to use as I please, that whose use lies within my power (potentia)’ (AA 6: 246; PP, 
406). It is not the case, then, that private property is a necessary condition of the coexistence 
of the freedom of choice of one person with that of all others in accordance with a universal 
law. Rather, as Kant himself is aware, if an exclusive right of possession is taken to mean an 
absolute or near-absolute right to exclude others from the use or benefit of something and to 
dispose of it as one pleases, the enjoyment of this right on the part of some is, in fact, likely 
to make the exercise of genuine free choice on the part of others impossible, or at least 
significantly more difficult. 
Kant states that the ‘real definition’ of the concept of what is externally mine is that 
‘something external is mine if I would be wronged by being disturbed in my use of it even 
though I am not in possession of it (not holding the object)’, whereas the nominal definition 
would be ‘that outside me is externally mine which it would be wrong (an infringement upon 
my freedom which can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal 
law) to prevent me from using as I please’ (AA 6: 248f.; PP, 403). In making this distinction, 
Kant presumably intends to draw attention to what this concept means when it is viewed from 
the standpoint of his Rechtslehre (the real definition) and what it is generally (and perhaps 
mistakenly) taken to mean (the nominal definition). The reference to being prevented from 
using something as I please in the nominal definition of the concept of what is externally 
mine points to two defining characteristics of private property: the right to exclude others 
from the use or benefit of an external object and the absolute right to dispose of it as one 
pleases, that is to say, in accordance with freedom of choice in a purely arbitrary sense. The 
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real definition, by contrast, implies the right to exclude others from the use or benefit of an 
external object that one does not directly physically possess or occupy only in so far as their 
use of it would be incompatible with my use of it. The real definition of what is externally 
mine does not, in short, entail an exclusive right to an external object in the same way as the 
nominal definition does,14 and it is only the validity of this definition of what is externally 
mine that Kant thinks he has established. To establish a pre-political right to private property, 
he would also have to establish the validity of the nominal definition, but he makes no real 
attempt to do this. 
It is relatively easy to conceive of scenarios in which the conditions of use are met in 
such a way that one’s freedom of choice is not in any obvious sense harmed at the same time 
as the independence of others is made possible despite the absence of private property. The 
same external object could, for instance, be freely used by two or more persons without the 
effective use that one person makes of the object interfering with another person’s effective 
use of it, as when the same piece of land is used for two unrelated activities which can be 
performed without either one of them undermining the successful performance of the other 
activity.15 An external object (in this case a piece of land) would in this way be an object of 
free choice, in the sense of an external object that is used with the intention of realizing 
certain ends, without any single person possessing the exclusive right to it, nor the right to 
dispose of it as he or she pleases. Given that the idea of intelligible possession for Kant 
requires that ‘abstraction is made from all spatial and temporal conditions and the object is 
thought of only as under my control’ (AA 6: 253; PP, 407), there are, moreover,  no clear 
grounds in any case for allowing considerations of space and time to justify private property, 
as if the fact that two persons could not occupy the same piece of ground or use some other 
material object at exactly the same time would justify exclusive possession of it even when 
the one who is assumed to possess this right of possession is not using the object. 
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Another example would be the use of books borrowed from a public library. Here an 
object is not owned by any single person. Rather, it is collectively owned and administered in 
the name of all and for the benefit of all, that is to say, in accordance with a general or 
common will.16 In this particular case the idea of the effective use of an object as a condition 
of independence could be extended beyond the idea that such use implies the existence of 
some end in relation to which the object is assumed to serve as an appropriate means. To be 
genuinely independent one needs to have access to certain objects or resources which enable 
one  not only to experience oneself as a being with the power to effect changes in the world 
in accordance with one’s own ends, but also to develop the capacities that are either 
preconditions of independence or ways of enhancing it. These capacities can be thought to 
include the ability to read about, understand and discuss social and political issues, capacities 
which are conditions of being able to think and to judge independently. These conditions 
might best be secured for all citizens in certain cases by some form of collective ownership, 
whereas private ownership would limit the availability of the necessary resources to those 
who happen already to possess them or are able to afford them. The use of objects would then 
be temporally limited, and in this sense no one would have an exclusive right to the relevant 
external objects, at the same time as some of the fundamental conditions of genuine 
independence are satisfied. This type of case becomes problematic only even if independence 
is equated with the idea of objects being completely subject to a person’s free choice in a 
purely arbitrary sense. Yet it is difficult to see how right could guarantee the independence of 
all citizens in accordance with the principle of equality without significantly limiting freedom 
of choice in this sense. This is not to say that a collective form of ownership would 
necessarily always be the most appropriate one when it comes to securing the independence 
of individual citizens. I shall return to this point shortly. 
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 Although Kant speaks of the original common possession of land, he invokes the 
notion of effective use to deny that common possession of the land would be compatible with 
the will to use it. Rather, the common possession of land would undermine the will to use it 
because ‘the choice of one is unavoidably opposed by nature to that of another’, and effective 
use of the land would therefore be impossible if this same will to use it ‘did not also contain 
the principle for choice by which a particular possession for each on the common land could 
be determined (lex iuridica)’ (AA 6: 267; PP, 418). Kant’s claim that common possession of 
land is incompatible with effective use of it, and thus with freedom of choice in so far as its 
exercise requires the use of external objects, simply assumes that the absence of fixed 
patterns of exclusive ownership will inevitably generate conflict between human beings. This 
is shown by the mere assertion that the choices of individuals are ‘unavoidably opposed by 
nature’.17 This claim is based on a view of human nature which can itself be regarded as 
conditioned by historical experience, in that the way in which private property dominates 
existing patterns of ownership can be regarded as the cause, as opposed to an effect, of 
human conflict. Kant would have to show, moreover, that private property does indeed 
prevent conflict, whereas the resources employed by states to protect it suggest that this is not, 
in fact, the case. It is also far from self-evident that even under conditions in which resources 
were scarce conflict could not be avoided at the same time as common ownership of the land 
exists, provided that people adjusted their expectations accordingly or had not already 
developed expectations that are liable to generate conflict in such conditions. Moreover, a 
condition of scarcity could conceivably compel people to cooperate as opposed to competing 
with each other for as large a share as possible of what is available. 
As we have now seen, the idea of different people using the same external object at 
different times or using the same external object at the same time for different purposes 
allows us to conceive of ways in which the independence of citizens could be maintained in 
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the absence of an exclusive right to dispose of an object as one pleases and to deny others the 
use or benefit of it. This possibility raises the question of who determines the conditions of 
use and when they have been violated. Given Kant’s views on the type of independence that 
right ought to guarantee, rights of possession and use would surely be conditional on what is 
needed to secure each and every citizen’s independence. It is important to note in this 
connection that Kant does not say anything that in principle rules out a collective decision-
making process concerning the allocation of property rights, in the broad sense of rights of 
possession and use that are legally recognized and enforced, in accordance with the end. 
Indeed, the possibility of a collective decision-making process governed by the law or 
principle of right is explicitly acknowledged by Kant himself when he claims in relation to 
the distribution of land that 
 
the law which is to determine for each what land is mine and yours will be in 
accordance with the axiom of outer freedom only if it proceeds from a will that is 
united originally and a priori … Hence it proceeds only from a will in the civil 
condition (lex iustitiae distributivae), which alone determines what is right, what is 
rightful, and what is laid down as right. (AA 6: 267; PP, 418)  
 
Once it is viewed in the light of such claims as this one, Kant’s failure to establish the 
rightful nature of provisional forms of ownership that simply need to be transformed into a 
legal right of private property in the transition to the civil condition implies that what is really 
required is a malleable regime of property rights. By this I mean a system of property rights 
that is determined by decisions regarding the distribution of land and other resources that are 
collectively reached on an ongoing basis with the aim of securing the independence of all 
citizens after some kind of deliberative process. Consequently, there ought not to be a 
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presumption in favour of private property, and even when private property is considered to be 
the most appropriate means of securing independence in particular cases of possession or 
ownership, it may be decided at a later point that it is no longer so. Technological 
developments and changes in the ways of organizing production that were inconceivable to 
earlier generations might, for example, open up to later generations the possibility of 
adopting alternative patterns of ownership, such as common ownership of external objects 
which were previously considered to be appropriate objects of private ownership. If an 
alternative distribution of land or resources favoured the maintenance or enhancement of the 
independence of all citizens more than any previous one did, Kant would surely have to 
endorse the rights associated with this new pattern of distribution even if it was incompatible 
with private property. Yet he does not explicitly draw such a conclusion. Instead, there is a 
tendency on his part to suggest that the transition from the state of nature to the civil 
condition will be one in which existing claims regarding the ownership of external objects 
typically receive legal recognition and protection by the state, as when he claims that a civil 
constitution is a rightful condition in which ‘what belongs to each is only secured, but not 
actually settled and determined’ (AA 6: 256; PP, 410).  
The alternative view of the status of property rights outlined above is nevertheless 
suggested by Kant’s own definition of citizenship in terms of the independence which comes 
from a person’s ‘owing his existence and preservation to his own rights and powers as a 
member of the commonwealth, not to the choice of another among the people’ (AA 6: 314; 
PP, 458). This alternative view of the status of property rights also finds expression in 
Rousseau’s idea of the ‘total’ alienation demanded of each associate with all his rights to the 
community as a whole. This can in part be taken to mean that a radical questioning of all 
existing claims to the rightful possession of objects forms a necessary condition of the 
establishment of a society in which the genuine independence of each and every person is 
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guaranteed. Otherwise the equality and independence which define citizenship will be 
threatened, or in some cases rendered impossible, by the greater bargaining power enjoyed by 
some individuals or groups on the basis of their possession of exclusive rights to objects that 
can allegedly in some way be traced back to pre-political rights that then only needed to be 
legally recognized and protected by the state. As we have seen, Kant himself provides 
reasons for subjecting such claims to collective scrutiny in a condition founded on the 
principles of equality and independence. Despite the practical difficulties to which it may 
give rise, this arrangement would, I contend, be more appropriate to a condition in which the 
citizens of the state live, to use Kant’s own words, ‘in accordance with laws of their own 
independence’, and in which ‘each is in possession of himself and is not dependent upon the 
absolute will of another alongside him or above him’ (AA 6: 317; PP, 460).  
The idea that the form that property rights ought to take is to be determined by the 
collective will of the people through an ongoing deliberative process that aims to identify 
how the independence of all citizens can be secured may appear to reduce such rights to 
something that must be decided on a case-by-case basis, and this in turn would appear to be 
incompatible with the aim of Kant’s Rechtslehre to provide principles according to which 
such matters can be decided. This is not entirely the case, however. To begin with, there will 
be a principle at work, namely, the principle that external objects ought to be distributed and 
secured with a view to establishing the conditions of genuine independence for all citizens. 
Secondly, the fact that the precise form that property rights assume within a society concerns 
only the application of this same principle does not exclude the possibility of certain general 
rules along the lines that a certain type of external object generally favours one form of 
ownership to the exclusion of other ones when it comes to establishing the conditions of 
genuine independence in a certain type of case. This might in regard to some type of external 
object justify a presumption in favour of private property, but only in relation to this type of 
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external object, and there must also be an openness to the possibility that this form of 
ownership may one day no longer be the most appropriate one even in relation to this type of 
external object.   
It is in any case difficult to see how this kind of objection could justify a presumption 
in favour of private property more generally. Rather, the principles of equality and 
independence must be regarded as fundamental, and it will therefore simply be wrong to 
prejudge what would in each and every case be the best means of honouring these principles, 
especially since people may in time become conscious of possibilities of which they were not 
previously aware regarding the possession and distribution of external objects. Even when 
private property may look like the better option, as with goods that deteriorate with use to 
such an extent that later users of these goods would not gain the same benefit from them as 
earlier users did, the issue is not especially clear-cut. If the collective will of the people so 
decided, the state could, for example, distribute goods of this type in such a way that each and 
every user of them received them in more or less the same condition (for example, as new or 
with the same degree of functionality) without, however, granting them an absolute or near-
absolute right to dispose of them as they please. In this case, it is not clear why we should 
here speak of private property. The general objection might be made that such a mode of 
distribution together  with the idea of an ongoing deliberative process that aims to determine 
what form of property rights will best secure the independence of all citizens raise 
considerable practical difficulties. Yet this objection would itself amount to introducing 
considerations that are external to Kant’s Rechtslehre. 
This brings me to a final point. If the distribution of external objects is to be 
undertaken with the aim of securing the genuine independence of all citizens, there will be 
limits to each citizen’s independence simply in virtue of the fact that human beings living 
together in society exist in a condition of mutual dependence. What must be secured is, 
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therefore, a sufficient amount of independence in the face of the limits that mutual 
dependence imposes on each individual’s independence. Sufficient independence can here be 
understood to mean enough independence to avoid the generation of asymmetrical relations 
of dependence in which one citizen has little choice but to do the bidding of another one, 
even when the latter does not directly coerce the former. Although private property may 
secure some citizens from this form of dependence, it can also allow some citizens to 
dominate other ones, as Kant himself recognizes. If it is here argued that private property 
therefore needs to be distributed in such a way as to avoid this outcome, the question arises as 
to how this is to be achieved in a way that does not violate the principle of private property 
itself through a radical curtailment of the right to accumulate property and to dispose of it 
freely by means of acts of exchange to which all relevant parties have consented. Collective 
ownership, by contrast, threatens to introduce a high level of dependence on the state as the 
body responsible for distributing external objects in the appropriate way. This form of 
dependence would, moreover, ultimately make citizens dependent on others in the shape of 
state functionaries. What form of property rights will best secure sufficient personal 
independence in relation to particular types of external objects in this respect must depend on 
such factors as past experience and forms of social and political experimentation. Clearly, 
this is a matter that cannot be decided at the level of principles of right alone. Given this 
element of indeterminacy, a deliberative model of the kind mentioned above, by the mere fact 
that it can accommodate such indeterminacy, looks to me to be far more favourable to the 
establishment of a condition of equality and independence than does a legal and political 
system based on a presumption in favour of private property which does not, therefore, 
provide sufficient space for the consideration of alternative forms of ownership.  
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1 I use the following abbreviations for the writings of Kant listed in the bibliography: AA – Kant’s gesammelte 
Schriften, cited by volume and page number; AHE - Anthropology, History, and Education, cited by page 
number; KrV – Kritik der reinen Vernunft/Critique of Pure Reason, cited by first (A) and second (B) edition 
page numbers; OFBS – Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Other Writings, cited by 
page number; PP – Practical Philosophy, cited by page number. 
2 The claim that independence of the choices of others provides the foundation of Kant’s Rechtslehre is found in 
Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 14 and Wood, ‘The Independence of Right from Ethics’.  
3 See, for example, Pettit, Republicanism and Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism for accounts of republican 
freedom understood in terms of this conception of freedom and how it differs from the liberal conception of 
freedom associated with freedom of choice and the absence of impediments to its exercise.   
4 See Kant’s statement that Rousseau ‘set me right’ found in one of his pre-critical writings (AA 20: 44; OFBS, 
96). Also relevant in the present context is Kant’s claim that whereas in his earlier works Rousseau presents us 
with a conflict between culture, which is the product of freedom, and nature, he seeks in his later writings such 
as the Social Contract the course that culture should take if it is to bring about the true development of the 
human race as a moral species and its eventual harmony with itself as a natural species (AA 7: 326f.; AHE, 
422f., AA 8: 116ff.; AHE, 169ff.). Clearly, then, Kant views the Social Contract as a key text when it comes to 
demonstrating how human freedom might be reconciled with the development of legal and political relations.  
5 Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings, 50. 
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6 For account of the historical background to Kant’s use of this distinction, see Maliks, Kant’s Politics in 
Context, 80ff. 
7 The classic example is that of the slave whose master just happens not to practice interference on an arbitrary 
basis but could, nevertheless, do so at will and with impunity if he wished to do so. Cf. Pettit, Republicanism, 
22f., 31ff. and 63f. and Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, 39ff. 
8 Cf. Riedel, ‘Die Aporie von Herrschaft und Vereinbarung in Kants Idee des Sozialvertrags’. 
9 Cf. Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 19, 63f., 66f. and 86ff. 
10 Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings, 50. 
11 This goes beyond attempts to argue that property rights can be subordinated to the right to be independent of 
the choices of others in the sense that property may have to be redistributed in order to guarantee the 
independence of all (cf. Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 270ff. and Wood, ‘The Independence of Right from 
Ethics’, 83ff). This is because this type of claim, as it stands, assumes the legitimacy of private property and 
thus makes a presumption in favour of it. For an attempt to work out the implications of Rousseau’s account of 
the conditions of a legitimate social contract in relation to property rights, see James, Rousseau and German 
Idealism, 96ff. 
12 It has been claimed, however, that in the section on private right Kant is aiming to provide a justification of 
possession and use only. Cf. Westphal, ‘A Kantian Justification of Possession’. 
13 This is suggested by Ripstein’s claim that, ‘Freedom requires that you be able to have usable things fully at 
your disposal, to use as you see fit, and so to decide which purposes to pursue with them, subject only to such 
constraints imposed by the entitlement of others to use whatever usable things they have. Any other arrangement 
would subject your ability to set your own ends to the choice of others, since they would be entitled to veto any 
particular use you wished to make of things other than your body’ (Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 19).  
14 Even if Kant suggests that it does when he later claims that the real definition of a property right ‘would have 
to go like this: a right to a thing is a right to the private use of a thing’ (AA 6: 261; PP, 413), if the term 
‘private’ is assumed to mean an exclusive, unlimited personal right to the use of a thing.  
15 Fichte indicates the possibility of this type of case in his Foundations of Natural Right from 1796-97 (Fichte, 
Foundations of Natural Right, 190). On the compatibility of Fichte’s theory of property with collective forms of 
ownership, see James, Fichte’s Social and Political Philosophy, 21ff. 
16 This form of common ownership should not be identified with the aggregation of rights of possession that 
each and every person who makes up part of this collective will originally had. This amounts to conceiving 
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property rights already in terms of private property. It might be argued that the form of common ownership 
found in a condition in which the members of a legal and political community have only the right to use objects 
subject to certain conditions presupposes a right of ownership akin to that of private property on the part of the 
state itself. For example, after using the term ‘private property’, Ripstein makes the following claim: ‘The power 
of the state to allocate land and chattels based on its priorities, and to determine the ways and terms on which 
they can be used, is a large-scale version of a property right’ (Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 89). Yet what if the 
state administers resources in the name of the people who collectively own it, but not in the sense that what the 
state administers is somehow the sum of its citizen’s property rights, whether existing ones or ones that had 
previously been alienated to the state which now owns them? Rather, no one is held to have, or to have had, an 
exclusive right to any of these resources, and the state is not itself the owner of them because it has only been 
entrusted with the task of administering them in accordance with the collective will of the people on whose 
behalf it acts and therefore lacks the right to dispose of them as it pleases. Ripstein’s claim shows only how the 
idea of private property has become naturalized to the point that some people are apparently incapable of 
conceiving the possession of external objects in any other way.  
17 Kant claims that it is not from experience that we learn that human relations are characterized by violent 
conflict prior to the establishment of a condition of right; rather, the very idea of a condition in which right was 
absent implies that human beings would be judges in their own cause when it comes to doing what they hold to 
be right and good, and this by itself would be sufficient to explain the insecurity of such a condition (AA 6: 312; 
PP, 455f.). It is questionable, however, that one could reach such a conclusion altogether independently of 
experience, for it is at least conceivable that the judgements of human beings in such a condition would happily 
coincide and continue to do. Admittedly, Kant’s point is that such agreement would only be contingent. 
Nevertheless, it is only if some general assumptions about human nature based on experience are introduced that 
this contingency itself appears self-evident.  
